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Abstract 
Quite often established migrants offer assistance and support that facilitate the arrival of new 
migrants. Why would migrants want other migrants to join them – so much so as to be willing 
to pay for them to come? We suggest a rationale. Our modeling framework is capable of 
explaining several stylized facts pertaining to transfers by migrants and the structure and 
dynamics of migration. 
 
Keywords 
Migration dynamics; Migrants’ transfers; Follow-up migration 
JEL Classifications 
F22; J61 
 Comments 
We are indebted to an anonymous referee for thoughtful advice.  Partial financial support from the 
Humboldt Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. 
Contents 
1.  Introduction 1 
2.  Analysis 2 
3.  Concluding remarks 6 
References 7 
 
Stark, Wang / Migration Dynamics — 1 
1.  Introduction 
One of the most thoroughly documented stylized facts pertaining to the process of migration 
is that new migrants are assisted by established migrants. Indeed, the information 
transmitted and the support provided by family and friends is critical to subsequent migration; 
absent the support, follow-up migration will not take place. The picture that emerges is that 
migration by high-skill migrants prompts migration by low-skill migrants (rather than the other 
way around). The latter’s migration is attributed to the assistance provided by high-skill fellow 
migrants (Lucas, 1997). What is the underlying rationale for this behavior? Even though it is 
not hard to understand why individuals accept assistance that facilitates migration, what 
prompts individuals to offer assistance? Why would established high-skill migrants provide 
assistance to low-skill workers to follow in their steps? Although the motives that underlie 
transfers by migrants to those who stay behind have been studied closely (Stark, 1993, 
1999; Lucas 1997), the analytics of migrants’ transfers to others to subsidize their ability to 
migrate has not. We propose – and model – an explanation for this decision. 
A large number of studies have sought to document the role and prevalence of the “family 
and friends effect” in prompting follow-up migration. The thrust of these studies is the 
observation that the provision of assistance can be captured by the supply of assistance 
which, in turn, can be measured by the stock of past migrants. “Students of historical 
migration between Europe and the United States have long recognized ... that the 
concentration of particular nationality groups in certain cities or regions dramatically 
increases the probability that other members of the same group will migrate there. Whenever 
the number of prior migrants has been included as a regressor in aggregate models of 
migration flows, analysts have found that it strongly predicts the rate of migration to the 
country, region, or city in question.” Studies that analyze recent migration to the United 
States show that, controlling for a large array of variables that portray the economic 
environment of destinations (including the destination’s per capita income), the size of the 
migrant stock is a strong predictor of migration from different countries and nationality 
groups. (See Massey et al. (1994) and the many references cited therein.)1 
                                                 
1  Given that in its early stages, migration is typically positively selective with respect to the productive labor-
market characteristics of migrants, the manner in which a migration stock forms in terms of skills is from the top 
down (rather than from the bottom up). 
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Since, notwithstanding the incorporation of various controls, a stock of migrants could 
possibly influence the incidence of additional migration through channels other than the 
provision of assistance from established migrants to the new arrivals, it is useful to 
supplement the evidence alluded to above with a concrete example that directly documents 
the provision of assistance. 
A particularly potent manner in which established migrants can support additional migration 
is to arrange jobs. A study (Meng, 2000) based on a survey conducted in 1995 of 1,500 
migrants in Jinan, China reveals that not only did 81 percent of the migrants to Jinan found 
out from “relatives and friends” what job opportunities awaited them, but also that 71 percent 
of them moved into jobs that were apparently “pre-arranged” for them by established 
migrants.  Indeed, the new migrants preferred Jinan to Guangdog in spite of the fact that 
wage rates in Guangdog were “much higher than in any other part of China.” Guangdog did 
not offer the pull effect of an established migrants’ pool. 
2.  Analysis 
Let S  be a migrant skill level and let there be two skill levels, high and low. Without loss of 
generality, let 1=S  for high skill and 0=S  for low skill. Let t  be time, tH  the number of 
high-skill migrants at time t, and 
~
tL the number of low-skill migrants at time t . Let tA  be the 
average skill level of the group of migrants at time t , and let ( )SWt  be the wage of a 
migrant worker of skill S  at time t , where 
( ) ( )
a
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
=
t
tt A
S
HkSW   10 << a  
such that ( ) ( ) 0>=¢
t
t
t dH
Hdk
Hk , and ( ) 11 >k . This wage function incorporates two 
considerations: a skill spillover effect and a skill separation effect. The skill spillover effect, 
embodied in ( )tHk , represents the idea that working with a larger group of high-skill 
workers raises the productivity and thereby the wage of a high-skill worker. The skill 
separation effect, embodied in 
a
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
tA
S
, captures the consideration that working with a larger
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group of low-skill workers distinguishes a high-skill worker more forcefully and renders his 
skills relatively more scarce and more valuable, thereby raising his wage. 
To incorporate the idea that initially migration is positively selective with respect to labor 
market characteristics, we assume that only the high-skill workers migrate and that the 
resulting wage of every high-skill migrant, ( ) ( )tt HkW =1 , is higher than it would have been 
at origin. 2 Given the wage function, if a low-skill worker were to migrate, his wage would be 
( ) 00 =tW . Let us assume that a low-skill worker migrates only if he receives one unit of 
income. (The wage at origin of a low-skill worker must then be between 0 and 1.) The 
question of interest is whether the high-skill workers will want low-skill workers to join them 
so much as to be willing to subsidize their migration. 
Let tL  be the number of low-skill migrant workers who are supported by one high skill 
migrant. Since each low-skill worker receives a transfer of one unit of income, the net income 
of a high-skill migrant worker becomes 
 ( ) ( ) 111 ×-÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
=-== t
t
ttt LA
HkTransfersSWY
a
. 
When a high-skill migrant subsidizes entry by tL  low-skill migrants, then, given the number 
of low-skill migrants subsidized by each of the other high-skill migrants, 
*
tL , 
( ) ( ) *111 tttt
t
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H
A
-+-++
=  
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. 
Since 
                                                 
2 Positive selectivity implies that the skill level of the migrants is higher than the skill level of the workers who stay 
behind. We refer to the migrants as high skill, to the nonmigrants as low skill and, without loss of generality, endow 
the former with skill level 1=S and the latter with skill level 0=S . 
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Since, in equilibrium, 
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The positive transfer condition implies that 
0
0*
>
== ttt
t
LLdL
dY
 
which holds if and only if ( ) tt HHk > a . Since 
( )
0>
t
t
dH
Hdk
, we assume that this inequality 
indeed holds. In addition, since 0, * <ttt
t
LLdL
dY
largevery
, it follows that 0* >= tt LL ; it is 
optimal for each high-skill migrant to support or subsidize the migration of tL  low-skill 
workers, to make positive transfers in order to induce such migration. The reason then that 
high-skill migrants make transfers is that the transfers raise their income net of the transfers 
above what it would have been absent the transfers. 
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We have assumed, without reasoning, a skill heterogeneity of workers. We have also 
assumed that skill formation precedes migration, and that skills remain intact following 
migration. We explain the first assumption and relax the second. Workers differ in their 
innate abilities. By time t , workers with high innate abilities have acquired high skills while 
the skills of the other workers remain low. Given the technology that governs the formation of 
human capital in the country of origin, and given the production technology cum the manner 
in which low-skill and high-skill workers are employed in the home country, it may very well 
be the case that low-skill workers in the home country are unable to escape their skill 
predicament. Not so however upon migration. Suppose that by working jointly with high-skill 
workers in the host country, low-skill workers acquire high skills – an on-the-job skill 
formation process is in place. Consequently, by time 1+t , the ttt LHL =
~
 low-skill migrants 
become high-skill migrants. Assuming that by that time the tH  migrants retire (or else die) 
we have that 
 ttt LHH =+1 . 
There is now a new constituency of high-skill migrants who find it optimal to support 
migration by low-skill migrants. Provided the supply of low-skill workers at origin is sufficiently 
large, a sequence of migratory moves ensues. The forces that induce a chain of migratory 
moves are built into the initial migration (as if a migration multiplier is in place). This is in 
congruence with a large empirical literature that views migration as a process rather than as 
an event and that perceives migration as spanning over a sequence of “cohorts” rather than 
being exhausted by the responses of members of a single “cohort.” 
The migration process can expand or converge and our model allows for both possibilities. If 
1* >= tt LL , the migration process will consistently expand while if 1<tL , the process will 
dwindle. Even in this case, if the smallest possible number of migrants is 1, the process will 
continue for a good while – indeed for as many as n periods where n is implicitly given by the 
condition [ 11... -++ ntttt LLLH ] 1= . 
We see that the number of low-skill migrants depends on the number of high-skill migrants; 
that the reason high-skill migrants make transfers is that transfers raise their income net of 
the transfers; that it is optimal for high-skill migrant workers to support or subsidize migration 
by low-skill workers; and that low-skill workers cannot migrate unless high-skill workers 
migrate. 
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3.  Concluding remarks 
An interesting policy implication is that admitting some migrants (for example, high-skill 
migrants) creates a constituency that favors migration by others (low-skill migrants), and that 
this support arises not (only) from possible political reasons but (also) from economic 
considerations. 
In earlier work (Stark, 1999) we argued that migrants may wish others not to follow in their 
steps, so much so as to be willing to pay them to stay put. In a nutshell, the basic idea in that 
work is as follows: when information pertaining to individual skill levels of migrant workers is 
unknown to employers at destination, all migrant workers receive a wage based on the 
average product of the group of migrants. Since high-skill workers would benefit from 
dissuading low-skill workers from migrating, they should be willing to make a transfer to the 
low-skill workers to induce them to stay put. The conditions under which such transfers are 
made were spelled out and their precise magnitude was determined. Migrants thus remit to 
nonmigrants motivated not by altruistic considerations but rather by pure self-interest: 
remittances protect the wage of the high-skill workers from being “contaminated” by the 
presence of the low-skill workers in the same pool. The idea advanced in the present note 
can be seen as the dual of the “strategic remittances” idea. In some contexts high-skill 
migrants benefit from the skill purity of the pool of migrants. In other cases high-skill migrants 
draw benefits from a skill dilution of the pool. 
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